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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to test the persis-
tence and pricing of earnings, CFO and accruals us-
ing Iranian data. In response to arguments concern-
ing omitted variables in the Mishkin (1983) test, it 
seeks to explore asymmetric effects by incorporating 
omitted variable capturing firm size, firm growth, 
sales and its variations and net operating assets into 
forecasting and pricing equations. The results in-
dicate that, 1) CFO is more persistent than ACC, 
2) excluding omitted variables, stock market price 
earnings and its components irrationally and 3) in-
cluding omitted variables, stock market price earn-
ings and its components irrationally, too.
Keywords: Rational expectation hypothesis, 
earnings, operation cash flows, accruals, Mishkin test
Introduction
In the some works on financial-statement anal-
ysis, researchers are very interested in how current 
(or past) earnings (or earnings components) aid in 
forecasting future earnings or cash flows, both of 
which are central inputs in accounting-valuation 
models.
Prior research has often termed the abnormal 
accruals (resulted from accruals models such as the 
Jonse (1991) model and subsequently modified ver-
sion of this model) as “discretionary accruals” and 
used these items as proxies for managerial discretion 
(e.g.Jones 1991; Subramanyam 1996; Erikson and 
Wang 1999). However, Healy (1996) and Bernard 
and Skinner (1996) point out that the residuals from 
accruals models capture not only managerial discre-
tion but also unusual normal accruals and uninten-
tional misstatements. Because of this measurement 
error in residuals of accruals models, it is difficult to 
determine whether the market overprice that por-
tion of discretionary accruals of earnings manage-
ment are the portion arising from the unusual busi-
ness environment.
Sloan (1996) investigates the market pricing of 
total accruals and finds that the market fails to ap-
preciate fully the lower persistence of the accrual 
component of earnings and thus, overprices total 
accruals. Collins and Hribar (2000a) also find that 
the market overprices total accruals. Sloan (1996) 
and Collins and Hribar (2000a) do not examine 
whether the overpricing is due to discretionary ac-
cruals, non-discretionary accruals, or both.
Subramaniam (1996) reports that the discre-
tionary accruals are positively related to future prof-
itability but this relationship does not necessarily 
mean that the market rationally prices these accru-
als with respect to their association with future prof-
itability, such as earnings.
Managers have chosen positive abnormal accru-
als to increase earnings before IPOs and SEOs. They 
also find that the market overprices these abnormal 
accruals(Rangan, 1998; Toeh, Welch, Wong, 1998a, 
1998b) find that. These studies have not examined 
whether the market misprice abnormal accruals.
However, Xie (2001) examines the market price 
of the Jones (1991) model estimated abnormal accru-
als to test whether stock prices rationally reflect the 
one-year-ahead earnings’ implications of these ac-
cruals. Using the Mishkin (1983) and Hedge-portfo-
lio test methods Sloan (1996) employs, he finds that 
the market overestimates the persistence of abnormal 
accruals and consequently, overprices these accruals.
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Dopuch, Seethamraju, and Xu (2005) investi-
gate the differential persistence of accruals between 
profit firms and loss firms. They find that accrued 
earnings are more persistent for profit firms than for 
loss firms and that only in profit firms accrued earn-
ings are overpriced, while in loss firms accrued earn-
ings are underpriced, albeit insignificantly.
In this paper, to divide total accruals to nor-
mal and abnormal accruals, we employ a piecewise 
linear version of accrual models. First, earnings 
are divided into operating cash flows and total ac-
cruals. Second, using a piecewise linear version of 
McNichols’ (2002) modification of Dechow and 
Dichev’s(2002) model, total accruals are divided 
into non-discretionary (normal) accruals and dis-
cretionary (abnormal) accruals to test whether stock 
prices rationally reflect the one-year-ahead earn-
ings’ implications of these accruals.
The Mishkin (1983) test provides a statistical 
comparison between (1) a measure of the market’s 
pricing of abnormal accruals (i.e., the market’s 
valuation coefficient on abnormal accruals) and (2) 
a measure of abnormal accruals’ ability to predict 
one-year-ahead earnings (i.e., the forecasting coef-
ficient of these accruals). Mishkin (1983) indicated 
that if the market’s valuation coefficient on abnor-
mal accruals is significantly larger than the forecast-
ing coefficient of these accruals for one-year-ahead 
earnings, the market overprices abnormal accruals. 
Mishkin (1983) suggested that if the valuation co-
efficient is significantly smaller than the forecasting 
coefficient, markets under price abnormal accruals. 
Since the forecasting coefficient is a measure of the 
persistence of abnormal accruals (Freeman et al. 
1982; Sloan 1996), Xie (2001) attributes any mar-
ket mispricing of abnormal accruals to the market’s 
failure to assess the persistence of these accruals.
Although the MT has been widely used in ac-
counting, certain aspects of the MT do not appear to 
be completely understood by accounting research-
ers, and the likely outcome is that incorrect infer-
ences have been drawn from prior research. While the 
econometric properties of the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) -based methods used in accounting have been 
extensively studied (see, e.g., Bernard, 1987; Christie, 
1990), little evidence (if any) exists on the specification 
of the MT as it is applied in accounting. One aspect 
of the MT that has been misunderstood by accounting 
researchers is whether or not omitting variables from 
the forecasting equation bias tests of market efficiency.
In general, accounting researchers have misunder-
stood the Mishkin which was referring to tests of market 
efficiency; however, there are any specific variables in 
the forecasting equation. More precisely, one can test 
whether the market is efficient with respect to earnings 
forecasts even if there are omitted variables. However, 
one cannot test whether the market is efficient with 
respect to specific variables in the forecasting equation 
(e.g., accruals). If the variables omitted from the fore-
casting equation, there are not priced rationally. Thus, 
they also correlate with the variables of interest in the 
forecasting equation (e.g., accruals). That is, based on 
the MT, one can reject efficiency (at least with respect 
to the assumed equilibrium model of returns) even if the 
forecasting equation has omitted variables, but one can-
not draw inferences about which accounting variable or 
variables are the source of the inefficiency.
In this research, we survey whether or notthe 
omitted variables (current stock return, sales and 
its variations, and net operating assets) affect infer-
ences drawn from the Mishkin test in listed firms in 




To survey whether or not the omitted variables 
(current stock return, sales and its variations, and 
net operating assets) affect inferences drawn from 
the Mishkin test, research hypotheses are as follows:
HYP1: The persistence of the CFO is greater 
than that of accruals.
HYP2: Excluding omitted variables, the stock 
market is not efficient on earnings’ information.
HYP3: Excluding omitted variables, the stock 
market is not efficient on the CFO’s information.
HYP4: Excluding omitted variables, the stock 
market is not efficient on accrual information.
HYP5: Including omitted variables, the stock 
market is efficient on earnings’ information.
HYP6: Including omitted variables, the stock 
market is efficient on the CFO’s information.
HYP7: Including omitted variables, the stock 
market is efficient on accrual information.
Applied regression models for the hypothesis 
test are represented in the next sections.
Sample selection and data collection
We use the 2010 version of Tadbirpardaz (the Ira-
nian database of Tehran Stock Exchange) annual data 
files (includes 444 firms, 3248 firm-years) and sample 
all firms in Tehran Stock Exchange between 2002 and 
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2008 with 20 March fiscal year end with sufficient data 
available to calculate the variables for every firm-year. 
In some cases whereby the required data are incom-
plete we use the manual archive in the TSE’s library.
We eliminate banks and financial institutions from 
the sample (13 firms, 75 firm-years). To eliminate the 
effect of outliers, we winsorize the 1% and 99% percen-
tile imposing all the data-availability requirements yield 
2,283 firm-years over the period 2002-2008, includ-
ing 18 industries and 307 individual firms. This is the 
full sample that we use for testing research hypotheses. 
We apply the pooled approach to model estimations.
Variable measurement
To test the HYP1, the following model is applied:
1 0 1 2 1t t t tEarnings CFO Accrualsα α α ε+ += + + +   (1)
Therefore, to test the HYP2 – HYP7, this paper 
employs the Mishkin(1983) approach (hereafter the 
Mishkin test). Specifically, to test the HYP2, this paper 
estimates the following simultaneous regression system:
1 0 1 1t t tEarnings Earningsα α ε+ += + +  
( )* *1 1 0 1 1t t t tRet Earnings Earningsβ α α ε+ + += − − +  (2)
Where, Ret
t+1
 is the buy-and-hold return over a 
12-month period ending 20 March of each year. To 
test the HYP3 and HYP4, we estimate the following 
simultaneous regression system:
1 0 1 2 1t t t tEarnings CFO Accrualsα α α ε+ += + + +  
* *
1 1 0 1(t t tRet Earnings CFOβ α α+ += − − −
  ( )* * *1 1 0 1 2 1t t t t tRet Earnings CFO Accrualsβ α α α ε+ + += − − − +
                                          
(3)
Now, omitted variables are added to previous si-
multaneous regression systems. For instance, to test 
the HYP5, this paper estimates the following simul-
taneous regression system:
( )1 0 1 2 3 4 5 1/ _
t
t t t t t t k k t tQuintile
Earnings Earnings a Ret a Sale a Sale a NOA P B Size Quintileα α γ γ ε+ += + + + + + + + +Δ ∑ ∑
 
( )
* * * * * *
1 0 1 2 3 4 5
1 1
* */ _ _
t t t t t t
t t
k t k t
Earnings a a Earnings a Ret a Sale a Sale a NOA
Ret





 − − − − − − 
= + 
  − − 
Δ
∑ ∑                                
(4)
Where, Sale (Δ Sale) is sales revenue (change 
in sales revenue) and are not operating assets. 
In this system, we control the size and growth 
(the ratio of the stock price on stock book value) 
effects, by including the size and P/B Quintiles 
binary variables.
Finally, to test two last hypotheses, the following 
simultaneous regression system is estimated:
( )1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 1/ _t t t t t t t k k t tQuintiletEarnings OCF Accruals a Ret a Sale a Sale a NOA P B Size Quintileα α α γ γ ε+ +Δ= + + + + + + + + +∑ ∑
( )
* * * * * * *
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1
* */ _ _
t t t t t t t
t t
k t k t
Earnings a a OCF a Accruals a Ret a Sale a Sale a NOA
Ret





 − − − − − − − 
= + 
  − − 
Δ
∑ ∑
                  
(5)
In each of simultaneous regression systems, 
the first equation is forecasting equation that es-
timates the forecasting coefficients (a
s
) of earn-
ings components (and control variables) for pre-
dicting one-year-ahead earnings. The second 
equation is valuation equation that estimates 
the valuation coefficients (a*
s
) that the market 





systems jointly using an iterative generalized 
nonlinear least squares estimation procedure, 
proceeding in two stages. In the first stage, this 
paper jointly estimates simultaneous regression 




. To test whether the valuation coefficients 
(a*
s
)are significantly different from their coun-
terpart forecasting coefficients (a
s
) obtained in 
the first stage, this paper estimates systems equa-
tions jointly in the second stage after imposing 
the rational pricing constraints,( *j ja a= , j = 1,2, 
and/or 3).
Mishkin shows that the following likelihood 
ratio statistic is asymptotically χ2 (j) distributed 
under the null hypothesis that the market ratio-
nally prices one or more earnings components with 
respect to their associations with one-year-ahead 
earnings:
LR = 2Nln(SSRc/SSRu)                                          (6)
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Where j is the number of rational pricing 
constraints imposed; N is the number of sample 
observations; Ln is the natural logarithm opera-
tor; SSRc is the sum of squared residuals from 
the constrained regressions in the second stage; 
and SSRu is the sum of squared residuals from 
the unconstrained regressions in the first stage. 
This paper rejects the rational pricing of one or 
more earnings components (i.e., *j ja a= , j = 1, 2, 




Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 
1. The mean (median) of earnings is 0.18 (0.19). 
The mean (median) of Earnings
t+1
 is 0.16 (0.18). 
The mean (median) of ret is 0.23 (0.06). The 
mean (median) of RET
t+1
 is 0.23 (0.06). The 
mean (median) of CFO is 0.10 (0.10). The mean 
(median) of ACC is 0.08 (0.05).The mean (me-
dian) of SALE is 1.77 (1.21). The mean (medi-
an) of ΔSALE is 0.28 (0.14).The mean (median) 
of NOA is 1.99 (1.41). The mean (median) of 
P/B is 3.00 (2.01). The mean (median) of SIZE 
is 12.92 (12.82).
The maximum (minimum) of earning is 2.02 
(-1.00). The maximum (minimum) of Earnings
t+1
 
is 1.37 (-1.99). The maximum (minimum) of ret is 
4.70 (-0.79). The maximum (minimum) of RETt
+1
 
is 4.52 (-0.79). The maximum (minimum) of CFO 
is 1.67 (-2.00). The maximum (minimum) of ACC is 
2.37 (-1.52). The maximum (minimum) of SALE is 
15.98 (0.06). The maximum (minimum) of ΔSALE 
is 6.44 (-3.90). The maximum (minimum) of NOA 
is 22.62 (0.09). The maximum (minimum) of P/B is 
22.04 (-2.91). The maximum (minimum) of SIZE is 
17.11 (9.56). Standard deviation of variables is pre-
sented in the last column of Table 1.
Variable Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev
Earnings
t
0.18 0.16 2.02 -1.00 0.19
Earnings
t+1
0.16 0.16 1.37 -1.99 0.24
RET
t
0.23 0.06 4.70 -0.79 0.67
RET
t+1
0.23 0.06 4.52 -0.79 0.66
CFO 0.10 0.10 1.67 -2.00 0.30
ACC 0.08 0.05 2.37 -1.52 0.32
SALE 1.77 1.21 15.98 0.06 1.76
ΔSALE 0.28 0.14 6.44 -3.90 0.81
NOA 1.99 1.41 22.62 0.09 1.97
P/B 3.00 2.01 22.04 -2.91 2.99
SIZE 12.92 12.82 17.11 9.56 1.37
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
This table reports the descriptive statistics of all 
variables.
Earnings: Net income
RET: Stock annual return
CFO: Cash from operations
ACC: Accruals that are earnings minus CFO
SALE: Sales revenue
ΔSALE: Changes in sales revenue
NOA: Net operating assets
P/B: The ratio of the stock market price of stock 
book value
SIZE: Natural logarithm of stock market price 
Pearson correlation coefficients
Pearson correlation coefficients are presented in 
Table 2. The results indicate that Earnings
t
 is signifi-







 (0.11), CFO (0.23), ACC (0.37), SALE (0.33), 
ΔSALE (0.30), NOA (0.17), P/B (-0.12) and SIZE 
(0.12). Also, Earnings
t+1
 is significantly correlated 
to RET
t+1
 (0.35), CFO (0.22), ACC (0.06), ΔSALE 
(0.14), NOA (-0.10), P/B (-0.13) and SIZE (0.07).
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In Table 2, other significant correlation coeffi-
cients are presented in bold format.
Test of HYP1
In order to test the HYP1, regression model (1) 
is estimated and the regression results are presented 
in Table 3.
Table 3. Regression results of model (1)
Variables Coefficient T-Statistic P-Value
Intercept 0.05 17.15 0.00
CFO 0.63 37.80 0.00
ACC 0.54 27.14 0.00
Adjusted R2 46.59%
























0.11 0.35 -0.05 1
CFO 0.23 0.22 0.06 0.16 1
ACC 0.37 0.06 0.21 -0.09 -0.82 1
SALE 0.33 0.04 0.27 0.10 -0.05 0.25 1
ΔSALE 0.30 0.14 0.23 0.06 0.01 0.17 0.59 1
NOA 0.17 -0.10 0.19 0.07 -0.12 0.21 0.74 0.34 1
P/B -0.12 -0.13 0.24 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.27 -0.06 -0.32 1
SIZE 0.12 0.07 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.14 -0.08
Significant correlation coefficients are presented in bold.
The results indicate that intercept (0.05), CFO 
(0.63) and ACC (0.54) are significantly related to 
one-year-ahead earnings. The result of the Wald 
test (55.69) shows that the coefficient of the CFO is 
significantly greater than that of the ACC. In other 
word, the persistence of the CFO is greater than ACC. 
Thus, the first research hypothesis is not rejected.
Test of HYP2
Panel A of Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates 
of forecasting and valuation equations of the system (2) 
and panel B show the Mishkin (1983) test results.
The results of the Mishkin test (19.61) indicate 
that the coefficient of earnings in forecasting (0.53) 
and valuation (0.05) equations are significantly differ-
ent from each other. This indicates excluding omitted 
variables, and stock market price earnings informa-
tion irrationally. Thus, the HYP2 is not rejected.
Table 4. Nonlinear generalized least squares estimation (the Mishkin test) of the market pricing of earnings 
to implicate one-year-ahead earnings (exclude omitted variables)
Panel A. Market price of earnings with respect to their implication for one-year-ahead earnings
Forecasting coefficient Valuation coefficient
Parameter Estimate Asymptotic Std. Error Parameter Estimate Asymptotic Std. Error
( 1α ) Earningst 0.53 18.47 (
*
1α ) Earningst 0.05 0.64
Panel B. Tests of rational pricing of earnings
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Test of HYP3 and HYP4
Panel A of Table 5 reports the coefficient esti-
mates of forecasting and valuation equations of the 
system (3) and panel B show the Mishkin (1983) test 
results. The results of the Mishkin test (32.80) indi-
cate that the coefficient of CFO in forecasting (0.55) 
and valuation (-0.22) equations are significantly dif-
ferent from each other. This indicates that, exclud-
ing omitted variables, stock market price CFO infor-
mation, irrationally. Thus, the HYP3 is not rejected. 
Also, the results of the Mishkin test (15.87) indicate 
that the coefficient of ACC in forecasting (0.46) and 
valuation (0.02) equations are significantly different 
from each other.This indicates that, excluding omit-
ted variables, stock market price ACC information, 
irrationally. Therefore, the HYP4 is not rejected, too.
In two next sections, we add omitted variables in 
system equations and again estimate them.
Test of HYP5
Including omitted variables, panel A of Table 6 
reports the coefficient estimates of forecasting and 
valuation equations of the system (4) and panel B 
Table 5. Nonlinear generalized least squares estimation (the Mishkin test) of the market pricing of earnings 
components with respect to their implications for one-year-ahead earnings (exclude omitted variables)
Panel A. Market price of earnings components with respect to their implication for one-year-ahead earnings
Forecasting coefficient Valuation coefficient
Parameter Estimate Asymptotic Std. Error Parameter Estimate Asymptotic Std. Error
( 1α ) CFO 0.55 17.90 ( *1α ) CFO -0.22 -1.66
( 2α ) ACC 0.46 16.56 ( *2α ) ACC 0.02 0.23
Panel B. Tests of rational pricing of earnings components







show the Mishkin (1983) test results.
The results of the Mishkin test (13.65) indicate 
that the coefficient of earnings in forecasting (0.57) 
and valuation (0.16) equations are significantly dif-
ferent from each other. This indicates that, including 
omitted variables, stock market irrationally price earn-
ings information again. Thus the HYP5 is rejected.
Table 6.Nonlinear generalized least squares estimation (the Mishkin test) of the market pricing of earnings 
with respect to their implications for one-year-ahead earnings(include omitted variables)
Panel A. Market pricing of earnings with respect to their implication for one-year-ahead earnings
Forecasting coefficient Valuation coefficient
Parameter Estimate Asymptotic Std. Error Parameter Estimate Asymptotic Std. Error
( 1α ) Earningst 0.57 16.73 (
*
1α ) Earningst 0.16 1.54
Panel B. Tests of rational pricing of earnings
Null hypotheses Likelihood ratio statistic P-value
*
1 1α α=  13.65 0.00
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Test of HYP6 and HYP7
Including omitted variables, panel A of Table 7 
reports the coefficient estimates of forecasting and 
valuation equations of the system (5) and panel B 
show the Mishkin (1983) test results.
The results of the Mishkin test (22.48) indicate 
that the coefficient of CFO in forecasting (0.64) 
and valuation (0.01) equations are significantly dif-
ferent from each other. This indicates that omitted 
variables, and stock market price CFO information 
are included irrationally too. Thus, the HYP6 is re-
jected. Also, the results of the Mishkin test (5.93) 
indicate that the coefficient of ACC in forecast-
ing (0.57) and valuation (0.28) equations are sig-
nificantly different from each other. This indicates 
that, including omitted variables, stock market price 
ACC information, irrationally. Therefore, the HYP7 
is rejected, too.
Table 7.Nonlinear generalized least squares estimation (the Mishkin test) of the market pricing of earn-
ings components with respect to their implications for one-year-ahead earnings (include omitted variables)
Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the persistence and pric-
ing of earnings and its components excluding and 
including the omitted variables (firm size, firm 
growth, sales and its variations and net operating 
assets). The results indicate even in conditions that 
omitted variables are rationally priced by stock mar-
ket; including mentioned omitted variables do not 
change the results of Mishkin test significantly. This 
result is not compatible to Anderson et.al (2009).
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